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DIN COMMENTS ON IM-341

Page ii, Section 7:

Include Saudi Arabia among the nations which would be allied or aligned with the US.

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Page 1, Section 3:

What is the difference between political and psychological warfare?

Page 2, Section 4:

Replace the sentence beginning "Under the supposition..." with the following: "Furthermore, the Soviet Government since the end of World War II has conducted a systematic and increasingly intensified internal propaganda campaign to whip up popular Soviet hatred of the Western world, particularly the US. The coercive powers of the Soviet Government, together with an all-out campaign to convince the Soviet peoples that their national survival depended on a successful prosecution of the war would cause the Soviet people to support the war effort. Particularly if the USSR achieved initial victories, the Soviet people would be stimulated by strong emotions of patriotism, even chauvinism, and their morale might be bolstered by the prospect of achieving a better living standard through the spoils of victory."

Page 3, Section 5, Paragraph a:

The reasoning in this paragraph should be tighter. The meaning becomes clear only by inference. The second sentence does not support the point intended, in fact the reverse.

Page 3, Section 6:

Atomic bombardment, on the other hand, might serve to confirm the worst fears of the Soviet people about the "American barbarians" and cause the people to rally in support of the government's war effort. Suggest revised sentence to read: "If the centralizing mechanism of government control were broken, disintegration would set in, provided local leaders proved opportunistic or local populations were armed."

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Pages 5 & 6, Section 10:

I. Political Alignment - DRF's position might be that Communist China may not be as irrevocably aligned with and subordinated to the USSR as assumed in this paper.

A. Question of whether the Peiping regime has accepted the thesis that its highest priority task is the preparation of international communism for the "final conflict." Final conflict perhaps is as nebulous a concept as socialization has been in domestic political and economic planning. International Communism, while always a main consideration in Chinese Communist thinking, on the action level probably has not ranked as high as either national Communism within China or international Communism on a far Eastern basis. To the extent that the Chinese Communists are inclined toward preparing for international Communism (in the Russian sense) they probably have not unequivocally accepted this thesis as a task of the highest-priority.

B. Question of word "probably" in statement about control in China exercised by Chinese rather than Russians. Also question whether Soviet advisers may establish "effective Soviet control over the whole of China." In spite of considerable aid and accepted advice, it does not appear that Soviet influence has taken the form of any significant general control over the stated activities, nor does it seem likely that such control is probable by June 1951.

C. Question of whether China will retain some freedom of action, even if slight, in event of war. Might depend upon where the war area is (i.e., whether or not hostilities break out at once in the Far East), whether China enters war immediately as a full-scale belligerent, whether -- when faced with reality of war -- Chinese "alliance" with USSR will remain unquestioned by Chinese. Furthermore, Chinese might retain some reservations with respect to the "freely available" resources and facilities offered to the USSR.

II. Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities

A. More emphasis might be given to the fact that China's own interests are being sacrificed, in event of complete subservience to USSR in wartime.

B. Another vulnerability that may be taken into account is the fact that the Chinese Communists have not yet attained solid control of the country: 1) South China area is still undependable; 2) traditional regional and local loyalties might be played on; and 3) regime must still (and in event of war, will increasingly) depend on police rather than persuasion for populace control. Exploitation of the South China and local vulnerabilities might perhaps constitute a second propaganda phase which could be increasingly employed when and as it became apparent that regional developments (such as a Cantonese anti-government movement) offered more promising prospects than the possibility of a break with Moscow by the regime as a whole.

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Page 6, Section 10, Paragraph 4:

Suggest inserting following change in sixth line from bottom of page:
"The regime's failure to fulfill these promises and the resultant continued domestic turmoil (including widespread guerrilla and bandit activity) and its diversion of effort instead to the support and implementation of Moscow-directed international ventures and costly war with traditional friends could be profitably exploited through propaganda."

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Pages 7 & 8, Section 12:

The section on Yugoslavia does not appear germane to the problems outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the basic assumptions. Moreover, 1) the phrase that Tito occupies a "precarious position" is not in complete accord with the findings of the NIE on Yugoslavia, 2) the sentence "Yugoslavia is finding it increasingly difficult to exist" defies clear comprehension, 3) the reference to Soviet intentions regarding Yugoslavia is not germane to the paper's problem, and 4) the "more pro-Western elements in the government" appears as a distorted characterization of the current situation.

Pages 8 & 9, Section 13:

Paragraph 2 - Omit the following in line three: "Probable because Rhine-land-Catholic influence is dominant in it.". In regard to the last sentence, we believe the Germans will also demand further revision of postwar settlements, and elimination of the remaining Allied controls.

Paragraph 3 - Omit last sentence.

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Page 10, Section 14:

Omit the first sentence. Apart from direct military intervention on the part of the Soviet forces, Communism is no effective force in Austria (and no effective force in western Germany). The second sentence would better read "...as long as the occupation exists and Soviet forces hold part of the country."

Page 10, Section 15:

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* (See Page 7 of OLR Comments)

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Page 10, Section 16:

In the first sentence it would be more accurate to state that the governments would honor their commitments, particularly since the subsequent discussion raises questions as to the morale of the nations concerned.

If the "crucial factor in the determination of the European NAT members to stand by the treaty...remains their ability successfully to do so," and, as also stated, "the continental states will lack the means of effective resistance," the reader is left to conclude that practically no resistance will be forthcoming in the event of war in 1951. Is this what the reader is meant to deduce? If so, the addition of the following sentence is suggested: "Hence no strong military resistance to attack can be expected in the event of war before July 1951."

Definite figures on "militant Communist elements," such as those given on page 11, are notoriously inaccurate. Moreover, whatever impression of precision is given by the use of figures is cancelled out by the sentence, "The numbers who could be expected to engage in open violence, however, would be less." Presumably what is meant is a figures including more than the hard core but less than the party membership. Under these circumstances the figures will vary according to the area expert.

Paragraph 4 is written in the present tense although the purpose of the paper is to estimate the alignments of foreign states in the future. It is an estimate that the unrest mentioned in some African territories and Cyprus does not indicate that these areas will present any major problem in the event of a general war. In the given assumptions, Cyprus, Eritrea, and British East Africa will not present any significant security problems. Recommended text (covering DRN areas only): "The prospect that nationalists in French North Africa and British West Africa may attempt to utilize the opportunity presented by a general war to stage uprisings will limit the extent to which metropolitan powers will be able to utilize loyal native and metropolitan forces elsewhere."

Page 11, Section 17:

We do not agree with the last sentence and suggest that, since it is not required in the context of this paper, it be dropped. A note of caution regarding Iran's alignment should be inserted. Recommended text (covering DRN areas only): "Greece, Turkey, Iran... which look to the US for support and protection, would resist direct Soviet aggression to the best of their ability. If, in the event of an East-West war, they themselves were not directly attacked, the position of each would be determined largely by such considerations as treaty obligations, the degree of Western support received, the proximity of the war to its own borders, and the extent of Western successes. While preferring to avoid hostilities, all these countries would remain cooperative with the West. In Iran, the tendency that is developing toward neutrality would probably not effectively change, by July 1951, Iran's present disposition to cooperate with the West."

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Page 11, Section 18:

DRA proposes that this section be reworded to read as follows:

"The other American republics would be aligned with the United States in varying degrees of effective cooperation. The Rio Treaty provides that in case of an armed attack against one of the American States within the Western Hemisphere as defined, the parties are obliged to render immediate assistance, the nature of such assistance to be determined by each State. The parties are also obliged to consult in that event to determine what collective measures will be required of all. In the case of armed attacks outside the Western Hemisphere as defined in the Treaty the parties are obliged to consult for the purpose of deciding which of the collective measures specified in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) will be taken by all, with the exception that no State will be required to use armed force without its consent. Thus co-belligerence is not required, and wide variation may exist in the action taken by various states. Some would be disposed to accept active military roles. None of the present American governments would favor the USSR."

It is believed that the description of the effect of the Rio Treaty as given above is more accurate than the description provided in the IM. DRA also believes that the proposed change in the last sentence is more fully in accord with probable developments in Latin America.

Page 12, Section 19:

In view of Saudi Arabia's definite orientation toward the US, the Dhahran air base agreement, and the absence of effective internal opposition to the US, Saudi Arabia should be clearly indicated as one of the states that would be initially aligned with the US. Recommended text:

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Page 13, Section 24:

It is suggested that the paragraph on the Franco regime be replaced by the following:

"The present Spanish regime is conspicuously and fundamentally anti-Soviet, and could not hope to remain neutral in the event of war. Spain has sought inclusion in the NAT but has been excluded from this and most European regional arrangements because of the strong aversion of powerful western European trade union, Socialist and liberal groups to its government. Before Spain openly states its intentions, it will probably attempt to obtain concessions from the west in return for assistance."

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General Comments:

The term "Korea" is used without definition throughout the paper. Pages ii and 11 use it meaning apparently the Republic of Korea or perhaps some unified non-Communist Korea, while page 5 appears to refer to the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. Certainly this needs clarification. Chances are greatest that "Korea" until July 1951 will consist of (a) the Republic of Korea; (b) UN(US) occupied zones north of 38; and possibly (c) refugee or border remnants of the DPR regime based largely on adjacent Chientao. Consequently the statement on page 5 is without meaning. The DPR as an effective regime is gone, so far as world-wide conflict by July 1951 is concerned. The nationalistic sentiment now finding release may, in fact, affect even Chientao.

On page 11, tying together "other recipients of US aid" in this analysis does violence to the position of Korea. Conflict in Korea probably will still be continuing by July 1951, and the possibility of Korea avoiding conflict in any case is extremely dim.

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Page 7, Section 11:

"The situation in Indochina is precarious." Since this would describe the situation for the last four and one half years, the sentence leaves something to be desired as current intelligence. Some phrase indicative of the acuteness of the present danger would be more informative, such as; "The military situation in Indochina is approaching the point of acute danger."

"In Indochina, French refusal to grant substantive independence...". The words "substantive independence" are too loose phraseology to describe the March 8 Accords between France and Indochina. Suggest "French refusal to grant more than substantial autonomy rather than full independence", etc.

"A Nationalist insurrection under Communist leadership gravely threatens continued French control." As an alternative sentence, suggest "A Nationalist insurrection under Communist leadership continues to diminish French control."

"The Military situation is such..." Instead of saying "even the most unequivocal French concessions... would have now but a slight chance...", suggest "nothing but the broadest possible political concessions to national aspirations, coupled with effective US military aid...." This suggestion is made because the important factor of US aid is not mentioned in the discussion of the Indochina situation.

If "It is probable that most of Indochina will have passed to Communist control by July 1951", US military aid to Indochina is a futile expenditure. Is that the intended implication of the sentence? If so, it is suggested that this be clearly stated.

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